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The Level of Democracy during Interregnum Periods: 




The polity2 variable from the Polity IV project is the most popular measure of a country’s 
political regime. This article contends that the coding rules employed to create a polity2 score 
during years of so-called interregnum and affected transitions produce a measure of 
democracy that lacks face validity. Using both single and multiple imputation methods, we 
construct and evaluate several variables that offer alternative measures to polity2 during such 
periods. We recommend that scholars using polity2 test whether their results are robust to 
using our alternatives and using multiple imputation techniques instead. Where robustness 
cannot be established, scholars need to theoretically justify the choice of either polity2 or one 




1.  Introduction 
Of the data sets available to scholars researching questions relating to democracy, the Polity 
data set (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Marshall and Jaggers 2002) is by far the most popular one. 
Social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular, are much more likely to trust 
Polity as their main source of information and use, if at all, one of its competitors as an 
additional robustness check.1 There are many good reasons for Polity’s apparent dominance. 
It offers the broadest coverage of all democracy indicators, including 187 countries from 
either 1800 or the year of independence up to 2008, currently the latest year available. It also 
relies on a fairly comprehensive definition of democracy, which includes electoral rules and 
various measures of the openness of political institutions, and provides detailed information 
on aspects of institutionalized democracy and autocracy in a country at any point of time. 
Notwithstanding this wealth of information, the polity variable, a composite score of the 
various variables included in the Polity data set, is by far the most commonly used 
information. Indeed, most researchers have a theoretical interest in the causes and 
consequences of a country’s level of democracy. No surprise, then, that to many scholars the 
data set became even more attractive when – with the move from the Polity III (Jaggers and 
Gurr 1995) to the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) version – a new variant of the polity 
score, called polity2, was added. While both variables are in principle computed by 
subtracting Polity’s institutionalized autocracy score (autoc) from its institutionalized 
democracy score (democ) to generate an aggregate democracy variable that runs from -10 to 
10, the polity2 variable has one main advantage over polity: it seemingly provides a 
                                     
1
  See Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Strand (2007) for a review and evaluation of available 
data sets. For robustness test with different democracy scores see Casper and Tufis (2003).  
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democracy score for periods of so-called ‘interregnum’ and ‘transition’, whereas polity coded 
these with placeholder values as -77 and -88, respectively, and therefore as essentially 
missing. In developing the polity2 variable, the principal investigators of Polity IV decided on 
simple rules for coding the political regime in events of ‘interregnum’ and ‘transition’. The 
explicitly stated aim of the polity2 coding is “to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime 
measure in time-series analyses” (Marshall and Jaggers 2007: 8). 
This article contends that the polity2 coding rules for the creation of what seems to be a 
measure of the level of democracy during periods of ‘interregnum’ and ‘affected transitions’2 
are problematic and produce democracy scores for some affected country years that lack face 
validity. They also have the potential to invalidate causal inferences from quantitative 
analyses using the polity2 variable. This becomes more likely if researchers use polity2 as an 
explanatory variable in a quantitative analysis in which the dependent variable is civil war or 
state collapse. 
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we alert potential users of polity2 to the 
necessity of paying careful attention to the problematic treatment of countries during periods 
of interregnum and affected transitions. Though we do not claim to have a unique better 
solution for this imputation problem, we contend that the several alternative imputation 
strategies we suggest result in alternative variables to polity2 that have higher face validity 
and treat the uncertainty associated with the imputed values more appropriately. 
Our second contribution is normative: This paper is motivated by the normative prior that 
estimation results should not be determined by the specific imputation rule used to impute 
                                     
2
  Transition periods are affected if they are either followed or preceded by an interregnum 
period because the authors of Polity decided to first recode interregnum periods and only then 
to recode transition periods using the previously imputed values of the interregnums. 
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missing values unless researchers can provide a compelling argument that the specific 
imputation rule used is optimal. If such an argument cannot be made, researchers should 
check the robustness of their results to using different imputation rules. 
We are hardly the first to argue that imputation by a simple single rule as conducted by 
the Polity authors can be misleading and – in any case – misrepresents the uncertainty of the 
estimate. This critique of simple imputation rules along with enhanced computational power 
of modern computers lead to the rapid increase in the popularity of multiple imputation 
techniques (Rubin 1976, 1996; Allison 2000; King et al. 2001). In brief, multiple imputation 
algorithms analyze the estimation model at hand repeatedly, each time using imputed values 
for missing observations derived from imputation models with random variation. Final 
coefficients are then averaged over the various iterations with the standard errors coming from 
the variation of the estimated coefficients across the imputation variations – what Rubin 
(1976: 585) refers to as sampling distribution inference. This approach has clear advantages 
over a simple, poorly justified imputation rule. Yet, the flipside of this approach results from 
the fact that ‘models’ used for imputation purposes are often poorly specified. 
The approach that we employ here accepts the general underlying premise of the multiple 
imputation approach, namely uncertainty about how to impute missing values. Having this 
important aspect in common, we part with the traditional multiple imputation approach in two 
important aspects. First, rather than regarding multiple imputation as the always best approach 
for dealing with missings, we see it as one additional strategy, complementary to rule- and 
theory-based single imputation strategies. Thus, we prefer to interpret the different model 
estimates employing various alternative imputation strategies as robustness checks. If various 
similarly plausible imputation strategies exist, the parameter estimates of the final model 
should be robust (not significantly different). If this is not the case, then the choice of the 
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imputation strategy drives the results. Second, we highlight the importance of using theory to 
specify the imputation stage of the multiple imputation strategy, simply because the multiple 
imputation procedure can only be as good as the model from which values are generated. As 
Gary King (1986: 669) reminded social scientists many years ago: “Some a priori knowledge, 
or at least some logic, always exists to make selection better than an a-theoretical computer 
algorithm.” We thus use information on the best-performing of our single imputation alterna-
tive variables to construct a more theory-based multiple imputation model. We apply our 
approach to two re-analyses of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) and Krause and Suzuki’s (2005) 
studies of civil war onset to demonstrate the influence of Polity’s imputation rule. Re-
analyzing these two studies we find that the hypothesis that semi-democracies or anocracies 
are more likely to experience civil war onset is less robust than previously thought. 
2. Polity IV’s Coding Rules for Regime Interruption, Transition, and Interregnum 
years: polity2 
Polity is based on expert judgment on aspects of institutionalized democracy and autocracy 
within a country (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995), based on theories of institutions and authority 
developed by Gurr (1974) and Eckstein and Gurr (1975). Critical evaluations of Polity can be 
found in, for example, Gleditsch and Ward (1997) and Munck and Verkuilen (2002). In this 
article, we are exclusively interested in the coding of the polity2 variable, which is identical to 
the polity variable with the exception of periods of interruption, interregnum and transition. 
Interruptions are periods of foreign occupation as well as periods in which two or more 
countries became “involved in short-lived attempts at the creation of ethnic, religious, or 
regional federations” (Marshall and Jaggers 2007: 17). 183 out of 15,036 observations fall 
into this category (1.2 per cent). Interregnums signify the complete collapse of the central 
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political authority, typically during periods of civil war (179 observations or 1.2 per cent). 
Transitions are periods between two political regimes that substantially differ from each 
other. They are periods in which “the implementation of generally accepted and substantially 
altered principles of governance is incomplete and fluid, resulting in mixed patterns that are 
difficult to define as either those of the old regime or those of the new regime” (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2007: 18). They account for 316 observations in the data set or roughly 2.1 per cent. 
While the polity variable flags these periods with values of -66, -77 and -88, respectively, 
and thus as essentially missing, the polity2 variable converts these placeholder values based 
on simple coding rules. We cannot describe the modification leading to polity2 any better than 
the codebook, so we quote from there (Marshall and Jaggers 2007: 16):  
 
It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple 
treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., 
-66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to 
+10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set: 
-66 Cases of foreign ‘interruption’ are treated as ‘system missing’. 
-77 Cases of ‘interregnum’ or anarchy, are converted to a ‘neutral’ 
Polity score of ‘0’. 
-88 Cases of ‘transition’ are prorated across the span of the transition. 
(…) 
Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year (…) are converted to system 
missing values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, 
interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value 0. 
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Polity2 thus provides modified democracy scores during periods of interregnum and transition 
in addition to the conventional democracy scores provided by polity for normal times. 
3.  Consequences of the polity2 Imputation Rules 
Given that there is no disaggregated information in the Polity IV data set on the political 
regime during periods of interruption, interregnum and transition, the coding rules appear 
reasonable at first sight: years in which foreign powers exert political control over a country 
are coded as missing, interregnum years are coded as what the authors of Polity IV deem a 
‘neutral’ score and transition years are linearly interpolated. Yet, on closer inspection, the 
polity2 variable turns out to be problematic. 
Any good measure has to fulfill two requirements: it has to be reliable and valid 
(Carmines and Zeller 1979). Reliable here means that in repeated measurements the measured 
values will be the same or sufficiently similar. With the exception of countries under German 
occupation during the Second World War, the Polity IV authors seem to have applied their 
modification rules consistently. We thus do not doubt that repeated measurements would lead 
to reliable measures. However, we doubt that the coding rules provide a valid measure of 
democracy during affected country years, i.e. we question whether polity2 validly measures 
the level of democracy in these circumstances. This is because on closer inspection the rules 
for the coding of polity2 for interregnum and affected transition years give values that are 
implausible and likely to be misleading regarding the political regime in many of the affected 
country years.3 In other words, polity2 lacks what is called face validity. To persuade readers 
                                     
3
  We say implausible rather than wrong and likely to be misleading rather than misleading 
because in the absence of knowledge on the values of the variables underlying the polity score 
in interregnum and affected transition years it is of course impossible to know what the “true” 
aggregate democracy score should be. 
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that this is not just our own idiosyncratic judgment, we will discuss some concrete examples 
below. On a general level, however, it is not surprising that a mechanic imputation of a score 
of 0 for all cases of interregnum without using any country-specific information cannot 
produce a democracy score that commands face validity. 
We identify two problems. We dub them the interregnum and the interregnum-cum-
transition problem. Note that both problems are caused by the modification of polity during 
interregnum periods. Since the authors of Polity recode interregnum years before they recode 
transition years, the interregnum recoding rule influences the recoding result of the transition 
recoding rule if transition years either precede or follow interregnum years. We discuss both 
problems separately. 
The Interregnum Problem 
The interregnum problem emerges from the coding of interregnum periods with a value of 
zero, which is meant to represent a neutral regime score. However, just because 0 lies in the 
middle between -10 and 10 does not make this a democracy score that is any more neutral 
than 0 degrees Celsius or Fahrenheit would represent a neutral temperature. Depending on the 
political regime before and after the interregnum period, a value of zero can represent 
everything but a neutral regime. To illustrate our argument, figures 1a and 1b compare the 






































Note: interregnum years are indicated by dark grey bars 
Figures 1a and 1b: polity2 scores of Afghanistan (left) and Cyprus (right) 
 
The two figures reveal that the coding rule for interregnum years can generate two rather 
different effects. First, for some countries with an undemocratic regime before and after 
interregnum (here exemplified by Afghanistan), the interregnum years are the most 
democratic years these countries have experienced over a certain time period. In other words: 
for Afghanistan and similar cases, an interregnum marks an improvement in the level of 
democracy. In the case of Afghanistan, if we trusted polity2, then the country would have 
gone through a much more democratic period during the four years of civil war than under the 
Communist rule of Najibullah before or the Taliban-regime after the interregnum. If we 
compare the polity2 scores to the scholarly literature on Afghanistan’s political regime, then 
for most if not all observers, polity2 does not accurately portray the state of Afghan 
democracy during the years 1992 to 1995 (Rubin 2000; Marsden 1998). Such likely mis-
representation is not restricted to one isolated case. Instead, for example, along similar lines, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ethiopia in 1974, Cambodia in 1975, Afghanistan in 1978, 
Nicaragua from 1979 to 1980 as well as Somalia from 1991 onwards are coded as much more 
democratic during years of social unrest and civil war than either before or after. While the 
11 
coding of Czechoslovakia is perhaps broadly in line with historical accounts of the Prague 
Spring (Williams 1997), the other cases are clearly at odds with common perceptions. In fact, 
for Afghanistan and Somalia, state collapse and anarchy represent by far the most democratic 
periods in their entire post-independence history. The fundamental problem is that when a 
country has an undemocratic regime before and after an interregnum period, then a 
democracy score of zero is unlikely to represent a neutral democracy score.  
The polity2 rules create the opposite effect in the case of Cyprus. Polity IV interprets the 
years 1963 to 1967 as interregnum years, even though neither the Correlates of War (Sarkees 
2000) nor the Uppsala/PRIO (Gleditsch et al. 2002) data sets indicate an armed civil conflict. 
Whatever the reasons behind the decision to treat this period as interregnum, the effect is to 
make Cyprus far less democratic than either before or after these years. In fact, the allegedly 
neutral value of zero during the period 1963 to 1967 amounts to the country’s most 
undemocratic period in its entire post-independence history.  Similarly, in Sierra Leone during 
1997 to 2001, the Solomon Islands during 2000 to 2002 and Comoros in 1995 civil unrest 
prompted the Polity IV authors to code an interregnum, leading to a decline in the polity2 
score relative to previous years. For Sierra Leone with its brutal civil war the polity2 score 
may not be far off the true state of democracy during this period (Zack-Williams 1999). The 
same may apply to the Solomon Islands, which slipped into chaos after rebels kidnapped 
Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu in June 2000 (Reilly 2004). But for Comoros in 1995 
the polity2 score is likely to be misleading since its semi-democratic regime did not become 
any more autocratic when French troops helped to thwart a military coup led by Bob Denard 
(Anonymous 1998). 
Similar to the other cases discussed previously, the (reverse) problem is that when a 
country has a democratic regime before and after an interregnum period, then a score of zero 
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is unlikely to represent an appropriate level of democracy either. Comparing both types of 
cases, we find that according to polity2 an interregnum increases the level of democracy in 
autocracies and reduces the level of democracy in democracies, an outcome we do not find 
plausible. 
Making things worse, the problematic polity2 coding rules are not applied consistently, as 
the countries occupied by Germany during the Second World War show. To recall, foreign 
occupation should lead to a polity score of -66 and thus to a system missing value for the 
polity2 variable. However, for no clear reason, the Polity IV project codes Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria as interregnums during their period of 
German occupation (thus their polity2 score is 0), whereas Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Norway are coded as interruptions (thus their polity2 score is missing).4 
Without doubt, periods of interregnum are difficult to code. However, we contend that the 
authors of Polity IV made inconsistent and implausible decisions when facing this difficulty. 
Coding all interregnum years as zero on the assumption that this represents a politically 
neutral value is naïve for basically three reasons. First, the political processes which cause the 
coders of Polity IV to treat country-years as interregnum periods vary largely. Both moderate 
political turbulence and unrest as in Cyprus, civil wars as in Afghanistan, and the German 
                                     
4
  The case of Austria is particularly problematic. In 1938, German troops invaded Austria to 
bring its South-Eastern neighbour ‘Heim ins Reich’ (‘home into the empire’), which was the 
Nazi-euphemism for the annexation of the country. After annexation, Austrians had the same 
rights (or lack thereof) and the same obligations and were subjected to the same political 
regime as Germans. However, while Germany has a polity2 score of -9 from 1938 onwards, 
Austria is coded as 0. This is inconsistent because either Austria was occupied by a foreign 
power or experienced a short-lived attempt at building an ethnic federation, in which case its 
polity2 score should be set to missing, or Austrians shared the same fate as Germans, in which 
case its polity2 score should be set to -9. 
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occupations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria are 
equally treated as interregnum years and assigned a score of zero, which we contend in most 
cases provides implausible information on the state of political regime in these countries 
during these years. Second, treating interregnum periods equally without regard to the 
political regime context leads to arbitrary dynamics in the level of democracy. Interregnum 
periods bring about an increase in the level of democracy in most countries, while in others 
the level of democracy declines during periods of anarchy. Third, if polity2 is used in 
regression analysis, then coding interregnum years as zero is not “neutral” either because the 
estimation of the coefficients of the polity2 as well as in principle of all other explanatory 
variables correlated with polity2 are affected. Thus, the coding of 0 for periods of interregnum 
is potentially not “neutral” to causal inferences based on regression analysis either – a point to 
which we come back later. 
The Interregnum-cum-Transition Problem 
The lack of validity in the polity2 variable caused by the coding of interregnum periods 
potentially worsens if such periods are preceded or followed by periods of transition.5 The 
interregnum-cum-transition problem emerges because the Polity IV authors decided to first 
code the polity2 score for the interregnum years and only then to code the transition years. As 
a consequence, any problematic coding of interregnum years carries over to the coding of 
transition years if a transition follows an interregnum or vice versa. In Polity IV, 128 
observations are affected by the interregnum-cum-transition problem. 
                                     
5
  Note that we see no reason to alter the re-coding rule employed by the Polity project for pure 
transition periods – that is, transition periods which are neither preceded nor followed by an 
interregnum period. 
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To illustrate our arguments, figures 2a and 2b plot the polity2 scores for Chad and Angola 
over the periods 1976 to 1985 and 1989 to 1998, respectively. 
 


































Note: interregnum years indicated by dark grey bars, and transition periods by patterned bars 
Figure 2a and 2b: polity2 Score of Chad (left) and Angola (right) 
 
As in the case of Afghanistan, we find that the coding rules underlying the polity2 variable 
lead to a sudden increase in the democracy score of both countries during interregnum years 
(see Azevedo 1998; Brittain 1998). The problem resulting from assigning a value of zero to 
Chad during 1979 to 1983 and to Angola in 1992 is potentially worsened by interpolating 
from this value, which results in an artificial upward movement in the polity2 score for Chad 
in 1978 and for Angola in 1991 and an artificial downward movement in the polity2 score for 
Chad in 1984 and Angola in 1993 to 1996. Similar cases in the period after the Second World 
War include Burundi from 1991 to 1996, Congo from 1962 to 1965, Cuba from 1958 to 1961, 
Guinea-Bissau from 1997 to 2000, Laos from 1960 to 1975, Lesotho from 1997 to 2002, 
Liberia from 1989 to 1997, Pakistan from 1968 to 1973 and Sierra Leone from 1996 to 2002. 
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4.  Existing Strategies Available to Researchers with polity2 
With the emergence of polity2, researchers using Polity can choose any of at least four 
existing strategies for their research designs. First, they can stick to the old polity variable and 
thereby listwise exclude -66, -77, and -88 observations – thus accepting that the democracy 
score for these types of regimes is impossible to identify. Second, they can use polity2 and 
thereby accept the imputations to polity undertaken by the authors of Polity IV on the basis of 
their coding rules. Third, they can employ the polity2 variable plus adding, in multivariate 
regression analysis, a set of three dummy variables: one for values of -77 in countries that 
have negative polity2 values before and after interregnum, one for values of -77 in countries 
that have positive polity2 scores before and after interregnum, and one for -88 observations. 
Fourth, they can apply a Heckman selection model which treats interruption, interregnum, and 
transition years as non-selected in the first stage and then accounts for the non-selection 
hazard in the second stage of their estimations. 
Each of these options is problematic. Listwise exclusion generates a non-random 
selection criterion which will often be correlated with many variables included in the 
estimations. As a consequence, in many cases listwise exclusion will lead to biased estimates 
(Honaker and King 2010). Using polity2 is problematic because its scores lack face validity, 
as argued in the previous section, and, more importantly, may impact causal inference as 
argued in section 7. Using polity2 with correction via dummy variables for interregnums and 
affected transition periods should give less biased, but also less efficient estimates if the 
dummy variables are correlated with variables of interest. Also, an identification problem 
occurs because it is impossible to interpret the effect of these dummy variables as either the 
effect of interregnums and affected transition periods per se or as correction for the coding 
rule applied by the authors of Polity IV. The Heckman selection model is not very 
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problematic from an econometric point of view. But it requires the development of a 
theoretical model for the first, the selection stage, i.e. a model which can explain interruption, 
interregnum and transition periods. Such a task appears to be difficult, if not impossible. 
Given this set of rather unsatisfactory existing options, we will now suggest alternatives. 
5.  Alternative Imputation Strategies 
In this section we discuss three methods that provide alternative imputation strategies to 
Polity’s coding of polity2. One method uses no information from outside the Polity IV data 
set, but applies different coding rules to impute values for periods of interregnum and affected 
transitions. The second method employs outside information. Specifically, we generate out-
of-sample predictions for interregnum years by using another measure of democracy (from 
the Freedom House data set) and theoretical determinants of democracy. For both methods, 
we then use the out-of-sample predictions for interregnum years to re-code those transition 
years that either follow or precede interregnum years. The increasingly popular method of 
multiple imputation, already mentioned in the introduction, provides a third solution to the 
imputation problem. 
 
Recoding According to Different Rules 
We suggest three alternative coding rules for interregnum and affected transition years that do 
not depend on any information from outside the Polity IV data set. All three start from 
polity2, but set all observations during interregnum years and all transition years that 
immediately follow or precede interregnum periods to missing. 
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Rule 1 (minimum level). Set the interregnum years to the lower of the two polity 
scores bordering the interregnum period. Then use linear interpolation to 
add the affected transition years (we dub this variable polity2min). 
Rule 2 (interpolation). Use linear interpolation to fill in both interregnum and 
interregnum-cum-transition years (polity2inter). 
Rule 3 (maximum level). Set the interregnum years to the higher of the two polity 
scores bordering the interregnum period. Then use linear interpolation to 
add the affected transition years (polity2max). 
In all three rules, interpolated values are rounded to the nearest integer in case the interpolated 
value is not an integer. Of course, the choice of these three recoding rules is somewhat 
arbitrary. However, they have three advantages. First, contrary to the mechanic polity2 coding 
rules, they use country-specific information immediately preceding and/or following the 
period of interregnum. Second, they therefore do not treat interregnums in countries with 
otherwise low or high levels of democracy equally. Third, they constrain the level of 
democracy to lie within the range before and after the interregnum. Even though exceptions 
are of course possible, in most cases it seems plausible that interregnums were neither less nor 
more democratic than the regime either before or after this period. 
 
Out-of-sample Predictions 
Alternative measures of democracy are likely to be powerful candidates for out-of-sample 
predictions. Of the data sets reviewed and evaluated in Munck and Verkuilen (2002), the 
majority is unsuitable due to poor country coverage or because they only provide a 
dichotomous regime type measure. Vanhanen’s (2000) data set has very large spatio-temporal 
coverage, but we doubt whether regime type can be measured solely based on election results 
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data, which not only ignores important institutional features of democracies, but also 
precludes a change in the democracy score between elections. 
The one suitable candidate for our purposes is the Freedom House data set. Covering the 
period since 1972, it is nowhere near as comprehensive in the temporal domain, but it covers 
all countries that are also contained in the Polity IV data set.6 The use of Freedom House data 
for research spanning a period of time is not unproblematic since its scale changes slightly 
over time and it was not originally designed as a time-series. However, the authors of 
Freedom House and of Polity use similar definitions of democracy and both are based on 
expert judgments. And even though the indicated level of democracy in certain countries can 
differ between the two sources – for example, Freedom House considers Qatar and Kuwait as 
more democratic than Polity IV, whereas the reverse is true for Russia – the correlation of the 
two democracy scores is very high. Given that Freedom House is the second most used data 
set for measuring democracy after Polity and since it provides values for all country years 
since 1972 that are coded as interregnum and transition in Polity, using Freedom House data 
for out-of-sample prediction of the missing polity scores is an obvious choice. 
In lieu of or in addition to the Freedom House values, one can use theoretically informed 
variables commonly regarded as determinants of democracy. Our choice of explanatory 
variables is informed by the number of missing observations. Specifically, we exclude 
variables with poor spatio-temporal availability. Analyses of the determinants of democracy 
typically find the level of economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 
                                     
6
  www.freedomhouse.org. In fact, it covers all countries in the world and therefore a good deal 
more than Polity, which restricts itself to countries with population size above half a million. 
In principle, one could apply our method to create out-of-sample predicted values to generate 
imputed Polity scores for states with small population sizes, but we do not do so here since our 
only concern lies with the polity2 recoding rules. 
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1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Barro 1999) and neighborhood effects (Gleditsch and 
Ward 2006) to exert the largest effect on the level of democracy. Accordingly, our theoretical 
model includes per capita income and its squared term, with data taken from Gleditsch 
(2002), as well as the lagged mean value of democracy in neighboring countries within a 
radius of 500 kilometers. To account for some heterogeneity across countries, we also include 
a dummy variable which is coded 1 if a developing country shares the main language with a 
developed country, a dummy variable for former Western colonies, dummy variables for 
regions as per World Bank classification as well as a dummy for countries with a 
predominantly Muslim population. 
To generate new variables based on out-of-sample predictions, we start with the polity 
variable and, first, set interruption, interregnum and interregnum-cum-transition periods to 
missing. Using an ordered logit estimator, we regress this variable on three sets of explanatory 
variables: once only the determinants of democracy (polity2 (det)), once only Freedom 
House’s political rights and civil liberties measures (polity2 (FH)) and, finally, once 
combining these two sets of variables (polity2 (FH & det)).7 We then reset all interruptions 
back to missing, replace all interregnum years by the rounded predicted values of our 
estimations and fill the interregnum-cum-transition years by linear interpolation (rounding to 
the nearest integer if necessary).8 
                                     
7
  Adding 10 to the revised polity variable to create a strictly non-negative categorical variable 
and then employing the negative binomial regression model leads to very similar out-of-
sample predictions for interregnum years (correlated at .97 with the ones from the ordered 
logit model). We found that the ordered logit model has a small advantage over the negative 
binomial model in terms of goodness of fit of the predicted values with the in-sample polity 
observations. 
8
  To construct predicted values we multiply the predicted probabilities of each polity category 
with the respective polity value and then round it to the nearest integer. 
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Multiple imputation 
Both our recoding rules and our out-of-sample predictions generate single imputed values. An 
alternative is provided by the technique of multiple imputation. In a first, multiple imputation 
stage, a specified number M of imputed values are created based on some imputation model. 
Then, in the estimation stage, the estimation is performed on each of the M imputations and 
final results are typically obtained pooling the M set of multiple imputation estimates. We 
will discuss multiple imputation in more detail in section 8, where we use it in our re-analysis 
exercise and where we propose to employ information on the best-performing single 
imputation variables in the imputation stage this strategy. Before we do so, we use a relatively 
simple out-of-sample prediction technique to evaluate the performance of our theory-based 
single imputed value variables based on recoding and out-of-sample predictions.  
6.  An Evaluation of the Alternative Single Imputation Polity Scores 
The imputation methods described above generate six new single imputation variables, three 
for the rule-based method that uses no information outside Polity IV and three for the out-of-
sample predictions using outside information. One research design option would simply be to 
use all these alternatives to polity2 in robustness tests. However, the different single 
imputation variables are of varying quality, so it appears to be good praxis to narrow down 
the set of imputation rules used in a robustness test. For this reason, this section analyzes the 
quality of the different single imputation variables based on out-of-sample techniques. In 
section 7, where we provide a re-analysis of two studies of civil war onset, we then use the 
best-performing single imputation variables, use a standard multiple imputation model as well 
as a combination of the two techniques, in which we employ the information on the best-
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performing single imputation variables to construct a more theory-based multiple imputation 
model. 
To start, table 1 provides a simple correlation matrix of the seven new variables and 
polity2. Clearly, the correlation between polity2 and our recoded variables are close to one 
due to the small number of missings, the correlation between polity2 and polity2 (det) is rather 
low, while the correlations with polity2 (FH) and polity2 (FH & det) are very high. 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix for polity2 and alternative measures (N = 4519). 
 
 polity2 min inter max (det) (FH) 
polity2min 0.995      
polity2inter 0.997 0.999     
polity2max 0.998 0.998 0.999    
polity2 (det) 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.710   
polity2 (FH) 0.916 0.918 0.919 0.918 0.702  
polity2 (FH & det) 0.930 0.931 0.932 0.931 0.772 0.983 
 
Since the true level of democracy is unknown for interregnum years, we cannot establish a 
priori which of the six alternatives is superior. In the following we will assume that 
procedures which predict values that are closer to the conventional polity2 scores during 
normal times also produce superior values for years of interregnums. We admit that this is a 
strong assumption. Using it, however, we can establish a ranking of the three variables based 
on out-of-sample predictions, while we cannot apply this criterion to the variables derived 
from our re-coding rules since by design they would be perfectly collinear to polity2.  
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Table 2. Goodness-of-Fit Tests between Out-of-Sample Predictions and Conventional Polity 
Scores (N varies) 
 




 Dependent variable: conventional polity scores 
 higher is better higher is better lower is better 
polity2 (det) 0.67 0.45 5.70 
polity2 (FH) 0.92 0.85 2.92 
polity2 (FH & det) 0.93 0.87 2.74 
 
The emerging picture from table 2 is clear: using another measure for democracy like the 
Freedom House data predicts conventional polity2 scores much better than using a 
theoretically informed democracy model according to all three criteria (correlation, pseudo R2 
and root mean square error). Adding the theoretical determinants as additional regressors to 
the Freedom House variables improves the goodness-of-fit further, but only marginally. 
Hence, if our assumption that an imputation rule is better the better it predicts conventional 
polity scores is correct, then the variables based on out-of-sample predictions using the 
Freedom House data together with the theoretical determinants of democracy performs best. 
We call this variable polity2pred, discarding the other two variables as they are inferior to 
polity2pred. 
We can now use the polity2pred variable to evaluate the rule-based imputations and 
the mean of the multiply imputed values. Similar to before, we assume that the rule whose 
imputed values fit more closely with polity2pred during periods of interregnum and affected 
transitions is superior. Table 3 displays the results from the same set of goodness-of-fit tests 
as we already used in table 1, to compare polity2min, polity2inter, and polity2max with the 
out-of-sample-predictions of polity2pred for interregnum and affected transition periods. 
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Table 3. Goodness-of-Fit Tests between Out-of-Sample Predictions and Rule-Based 
Imputations for Interregnum and Affected Transition Years (N = 39) 
 




 Dependent variable: Out-of-sample predictions from model using 
Freedom House data and determinants of democracy 
 higher is better higher is better lower is better 
polity2min 0.83 0.67 2.23 
polity2inter 0.80 0.64 2.35 
polity2max 0.77 0.58 2.54 
 
Apparently, the minimum level rule performs better than the interpolation rule, which in turn 
performs better than the maximum level rule. 
7.  Improving Inferences by Combining Theory-based Single Imputation with 
Multiple Imputation: Two Re-analysis Examples 
We have argued above that the Polity IV project’s coding rules for interregnum and affected 
transition years lead to democracy scores that lack face validity and have proposed several 
alternative variables. Given that country years of interregnum and interregnum-cum-transition 
represent a very small share of the total observations and replacing polity2 with one of our 
alternative variables may thus only affect a small proportion of a sample used in research, the 
question is whether scholars must be concerned about the manifest problems with the polity2 
variable. Does the lack of validity in polity2 affect either descriptive or causal inference? 
If researchers are mainly interested in global population descriptives (e.g., changes in 
the global mean of democracy), then the affected share of observations is so small that our 
proposed alternative measures would be very unlikely to make a significant difference. If, 
however, they are interested in sub-sample population description (e.g., the number or share 
of autocracies, democracies or anocracies, that is countries in between autocracy and 
democracy), then descriptive inference can be affected as polity2 would often code affected 
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country years as anocracies whereas our alternative variables would often code them as either 
autocracies or democracies. 
Most researchers use the Polity data for causal inference, however. We therefore explore 
the effect of using our alternative variable on causal inference in greater detail. Researchers 
should indeed be concerned about the problems that polity2 can create for several reasons. 
First, using more accurate information is a value in itself. Social science data are often noisy, 
which renders estimations inefficient. More valid measures lower measurement error and thus 
lead to more reliable estimation results. 
Second, using the polity2 variable can lead to significantly different estimates compared 
to using each of our alternative variables. This is more likely to happen the larger the share of 
interregnum and interregnum-cum-transition country years in the sample. Examples consist of 
a pre-First World War sample of predominantly Latin American countries, a sample of 
predominantly European countries during or around the Second World War, or a post-Second 
World War sample of mainly Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Third, even global samples can be affected if scholars transform the polity2 variable into 
three dummy variables for autocracies, democracies and semi-democracies (sometimes 
referred to as anocracies) or test for a non-linear effect in the continuous polity2 variable. 
Interregnums will always be categorized as periods of anocracies in polity2 (as will some 
affected transition years), whereas our alternative variables will sometimes categorize them as 
autocracies, anocracies or even democracies, depending on the case, thus changing the 
distribution and means of covariates in these three groups of countries. 
Fourth, other global samples can also be affected if scholars employ a fixed effects or a 
first differences model. In these cases, the between-variation of the variables is ignored so that 
the within-variation in the polity2 variable becomes the sole information used in the 
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estimation. Accordingly, the large upward and downward changes in polity2 that often happen 
during interregnum and interregnum-cum-transition years become an issue and are likely to 
exert a large influence on the estimates. 
Fifth, any of the causes of wrong inference discussed so far will become exacerbated if 
the dependent variable is either state failure (collapse of central political authority) itself or a 
determinant of state failure. These events make it very likely that a country will be coded by 
Polity IV as going through an interregnum. In other words, the dependent variable determines 
the coding of polity2, hence using polity2 as an explanatory variable will lead to biased 
estimates due to endogeneity. Thus, studies of civil war and state collapse are more likely to 
find that country years with a polity2 score of zero have a higher likelihood of civil war and 
state collapse because civil wars and state collapse to some extent cause a polity2 score of 
zero, rather than the other way around. 
To illustrate some of the potential problems with inference based on polity2, we re-
analyze two empirical analyses of civil war onset using a) our best-performing single 
imputation variables; b) a standard multiple imputation model; and c) a combination of the 
two in which information on the best-performing single imputation variables is used to 
construct a more theory-based multiple imputation model. One of these studies, Krause and 
Suzuki (2005), was selected because it employs two separate samples for Asian and Sub-
Saharan African countries over the period 1950 to 1992, which according to our discussion 
above should make problems with statistical inference using polity2 more likely. The other, 
Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) prominent study of civil war onset, was chosen to show that such 
problems can occur, if to a far lesser extent, even in a global sample over the period 1945 to 
1999. Both Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Krause and Suzuki (2005) find that anocracies are 
more likely to experience civil war onsets than either autocracies or democracies. 
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Fearon and Laitin define anocracies as countries with a polity2 score between -5 and 5 
while democracies are countries with a polity2 score between 6 and 10. Political instability is 
a dummy variable set to one if there has been a 3-point or more change in polity2 in the 
previous three years or a period of interregnum or transition. Model 4.1 of table 4 replicates 
model 3 of table 1 from Fearon and Laitin (2003), which is their preferred model. The 
anocracy dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at p = 0.028, whereas the 
democracy dummy variable is not. This implies that anocracies have a statistically 
significantly higher risk of civil war onset compared to autocracies, the omitted reference 
category, whereas democracies do not. Note, however, that the anocracy and democracy 
dummy variables are not statistically significantly different from each other.  
In models 4.2 and 4.3 we replace the anocracy and democracy dummies, which were 
based on polity2, with similarly constructed dummy variables for anocracies and democracies 
derived from polity2min and polity2pred, respectively, the two best-performing single 
imputation variables from section 6. The anocracy dummy, which was significant at the 5 per 
cent level in Fearon and Laitin (2003) is no longer statistically significant if polity2min or 
polity2pred are used. These changes in the estimated coefficients and the standard errors 
result from the re-classification of several observations from anocracies in polity2 to 
autocracies in polity2min.  
Model 4.4 uses a multivariate normal regression multiple imputation technique based on 
Bayesian iterative Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedures to impute the 66 
interregnum and affected transition observations, using all the variables in the estimation 
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model plus regional dummy variables to create 100 sets of imputed values.9 We call this a 
standard multiple imputation model. The coefficient of the anocracy dummy variable is again 
no longer statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
In model 4.5, we repeat the MCMC multiple imputation procedure, but this time 
specifying the imputation stage differently. Honaker and King (2010) argue that standard 
imputation models often work very poorly for time-series cross-section data as such data 
violate the assumptions of conditional independence and exchangeability of observations. 
They suggest, among other things, to include lags and leads of the variables that have 
missings as variables in the imputation model in order to impose smoother trends in the 
variables to be imputed than what is typically generated by a standard imputation model. One 
of the two best-performing variables from section 6, polity2min, allows us to do exactly that 
(we additionally include polity2max to follow their recommendation to include leads in 
addition to lags). Honaker and King (2010) also propose to incorporate expert knowledge in 
the form of new types of Bayesian priors. We agree with the idea of including expert 
knowledge, but do so in the form of including variables based on expert knowledge in the 
imputation stage. In section 6, the out-of-sample predictions based on Freedom House data 
proved to be a good predictor of polity and since the Freedom House data can be regarded as 
reflecting expert knowledge, we also include them in the imputation stage (after 1972).10 With 
                                     
9
  We convert the continuous imputed values to discrete values of 0 or 1 to be consistent with the 
dummy variable approach of Fearon and Laitin (2003). Using a logit imputation technique 
instead leads to similar results. 
10
  In principle, one could include further variables such as the theoretical determinants of 
democracy in the imputation stage, but since these variables themselves have missings and, as 
section 6 showed, did not add much to the out-of-sample predictions based on Freedom House 
data alone, we do not include them here. 
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this alternative multiple imputation model, the anocracy dummy variable is now statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level. If one accepts that, being theory-based, this multiple 
imputation model 4.5 is superior to model 4.4, then the analysis would again corroborate the 
hypothesis that anocracies are more prone to experience civil war onset. 
Model 4.6 repeats the MCMC imputation, but this time combines the variables from the 
respective imputation stages of models 4.4 and 4.5. In other words, the imputation stage now 
includes all the variables of the estimation model plus the polity2min, polity2max and the 
Freedom House variables. The estimation results are very similar to the ones from model 4.5, 
which suggests that the variables from the estimation model add very little information to the 
imputation stage. We take this as evidence suggesting that imputing the interregnum and 
affected transition years exclusively with polity2min, polity2max and Freedom House 
variables is sufficiently good for making valid inferences. In fact, if one were to run a 
standard logit estimation model in which one included the average of the 100 imputed polity 
values of the imputation stage from model 4.5, then results are very, very similar to the ones 
from the multiple imputation model 4.5 (results not shown). We take this as evidence that if 
researchers do not want to undertake multiple imputation based on our polity2min, polity2max 
and Freedom House variables themselves, then they can safely use the mean of imputed polity 
values from an imputation model, in which these variables were used.11 
Table 5 exactly repeats this exercise for the estimation results from table 1 of Krause and 
Suzuki (2005) for their sample of Asian countries. Whereas Fearon and Laitin use anocracy 
                                     
11
  Employing the mean of imputed values instead of using multiple imputation will slightly 
under-estimate standard errors as one single value is used instead of the multiply imputed 
values, but due to the relatively small share of imputed values, there is almost no difference to 
the standard errors that would result from employing multiple imputation. 
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and democracy dummies, Krause and Suzuki employ the continuous polity2 score (to which 
they add 10 to make it strictly non-negative) and its squared term. They find a non-linear 
effect in both samples: polity2 is positive and statistically significant, whereas its squared 
term is negative and statistically significant, which again suggests that the risk of civil war 
onset is highest in countries with an intermediate polity2 score, i.e. in semi-democracies or 
anocracies (model 5.1). Estimating, with one small exception12, the same set of models (in the 
same order) as in the replication of Fearon and Laitin (2003), we find the evidence for the 
anocracy hypothesis to be non-robust. The coefficients of the regime and regime squared 
variables become less significant or even insignificant when our single imputed alternative 
variables are used and become altogether insignificant in any of the multiple imputation 
exercises. We have also replicated Krause and Suzuki’s estimations for their Sub-Saharan 
Africa sample (re-analysis results not shown). Neither regime nor regime squared is 
significant in any of the models that does not use polity2. 
The results presented in Krause and Suzuki (2005) and, to a far lesser extent, in Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) are thus sensitive to our recoding of the polity2 variable or to using multiple 
imputation for interregnums and affected transition periods.13 In polity2 all interregnums and 
some of the affected interregnum-cum-transition periods are coded as anocracies. Moreover, 
civil war onset, the dependent variable, is correlated with the likelihood that a country 
experiences a period of interregnum and interregnum-cum-transition since civil wars are the 
prime cause of interregnums. Thereby, the polity2 score inflates the probability that a study of 
                                     
12
  The maximum likelihood did not converge when using polity2pred. We therefore used the 
out-of-sample predictions based on the theoretical determinants of democracy instead. 
13
  For additional evidence that the anocracy result in Fearon and Laitin (2003) is fairly robust to 
changes in research design, see De Soysa and Neumayer (2007). 
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civil war onset will find that anocracies have a higher likelihood of civil war onset. In sum, 
the evidence for the anocracy-hypothesis seems to be less robust than previously believed.  
8.  Conclusion 
Political system attributes in general and the level of democracy in particular are difficult to 
measure. This holds true even more so in difficult times – years in which the execution of 
political power is hampered by civil wars, coups, social unrest, foreign intervention, 
leadership struggles and similar events. It was thus a good idea of the makers of the Polity 
project to flag these years, which allows researchers to give them special attention. It was not 
an equally good idea, however, to apply a seemingly plausible, but in fact problematic fix for 
providing a polity2 score for years of interregnum and transition. A polity score of zero is not 
a “neutral”, equally suitable score for all instances of interregnum. Neutrality in an arbitrarily 
chosen scale does not exist. For most countries experiencing interregnums, these years were 
coded as more democratic than either before or after interregnum. Similarly, for some other 
countries experiencing interregnums, these years were coded as less democratic than either 
before or after interregnum. We have argued that the polity2 coding rules produce values that 
lack face validity. 
We have briefly evaluated existing strategies available to researchers, but found all of 
them problematic. We therefore used three methods to construct alternative variables to 
polity2. We discussed several general conditions under which using our alternative variables 
would change causal inference compared to polity2. For Krause and Suzuki (2005), we have 
shown in a re-analysis that applying these alternative variables or using multiple imputation 
techniques leads to different statistical inferences concerning the effect of anocracy on the risk 
of civil war onset. The results of Fearon and Laitin (2003), however, appear to be more robust 
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if our theory-based single imputation values are in turn included in the multiple imputation 
model. 
What then should applied researchers do? We recommend that scholars test whether their 
results derived from using polity2 are robust to using our alternative variables or using 
multiple imputation techniques instead. If results turn out to be robust, then causal inference 
does not seem to suffer much from the problems of polity2. If results differ significantly then 
researchers need to theoretically justify the use of either polity2 or one of our alternative 
variables or of multiple imputation. When researchers choose to employ multiple imputation, 
we also recommend including, additionally or exclusively, our alternative variables plus the 
Freedom House variables in the imputation model.  
Our analysis has wider implications as well, however. What we propose here is a method 
that combines strategies from theory-based single imputation with the use of multiple 
imputation algorithms together with a call for robustness checks across estimates from the 
range of values generated by different imputation methods. We believe that the combination 
of this method plus robustness checks offers an important step forward not only for dealing 
with interregnum periods in the Polity data set, but for dealing with missings in general.  
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Appendix A: Examples of Interregnum and Interregnum-cum-Transition Periods  
Table A1 shows the scores of polity, polity2, polity2pred, polity2min, polity2inter and 
polity2max for Afghanistan over the period 1989 to 1997. Afghanistan is remarkable because 
the Polity IV coding rules for polity2 provide the country with a much higher level of 
democracy than either before or after. In contrast, the four alternative variables suggest a far 
lower level of Afghan democracy during this time period. 
 
Table A1: Imputed Polity scores for Afghanistan 1989-1998 
 
year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
polity -8 -8 -8 -77 -77 -77 -77 -7 -7 -7 
polity2 -8 -8 -8 0 0 0 0 -7 -7 -7 
polity2pred -8 -8 -8 -6 -8 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 
polity2min -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 
polity2inter -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
polity2max -8 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
 
Conversely, for Cyprus our alternative variables suggest a far higher level of democracy 
during the interregnum period (table A2). 
 
Table A2: Imputed Polity scores for Cyprus 1960-1969 
 
year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
polity 8 8 8 -77 -77 -77 -77 -77 7 7 
polity2 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 
polity2pred 8 8 8 .. .. .. .. .. 7 7 
polity2min 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
polity2inter 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 
polity2max 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 
 
Table A3 presents the values for Chad over the period 1976 to 1985. Imputations based on 
out-of-sample predictions and our rule-based recodings lead to similar results: The openness 
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of Chad’s political system has not changed much during the interregnum and affected 
transition period.  
 
Table A3: Imputed Polity scores for Chad 1976-1985 
 
year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
polity -7 -7 -88 -77 -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 -7 
polity2 -7 -7 -3 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -7 
polity2pred -7 -7 -6 -6 -8 -8 -8 -8 -7 -7 
polity2min -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
polity2inter -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
polity2max -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
 
Table A4 provides an example how the various alternative variables can lead to somewhat 
different democracy scores, here for Angola’s interregnum-cum-transition period in the 
1990s: 
 
Table A4: Imputed Polity scores for Angola 1989-1998 
 
year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
polity -7 -7 -88 -77 -88 -88 -88 -88 -3 -3 
polity2 -7 -7 -3 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 
polity2pred -7 -7 -6 -6 -5 -5 -4 -4 -3 -3 
polity2min -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -3 -3 
polity2inter -7 -7 -6 -6 -5 -4 -4 -3 -3 -3 
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Table 4. Replication of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and robustness tests. 
 
 model 4.1 model 4.2 model 4.3 model 4.4 model 4.5 model 4.6 
 polity2 polity2min polity2pred standard  
mult. imp. 
theory-based 
mult. imp.  
mult. imp. 
comb. of 4.4 & 4.5 
Prior war -0.916 -0.870 -0.983 -0.905 -0.906 -0.907 
 (0.312)*** (0.312)*** (0.384)** (0.313)*** (0.312)*** (0.312)*** 
Per capita income -0.318 -0.305 -0.334 -0.319 -0.318 -0.318 
 (0.071)*** (0.071)*** (0.097)*** (0.071)*** (0.071)*** (0.071)*** 
log(population) 0.272 0.270 0.287 0.268 0.271 0.270 
 (0.074)*** (0.074)*** (0.093)*** (0.074)*** (0.074)*** (0.074)*** 
log(% mountainous) 0.199 0.195 0.205 0.202 0.199 0.199 
 (0.085)** (0.085)** (0.102)** (0.085)** (0.085)** (0.085)** 
Noncontiguous state 0.426 0.457 0.533 0.450 0.428 0.428 
 (0.272) (0.273)* (0.422) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) 
Oil exporter 0.751 0.728 0.287 0.760 0.750 0.752 
 (0.278)*** (0.279)*** (0.365) (0.279)*** (0.278)*** (0.278)*** 
New state 1.658 1.712 2.342 1.683 1.669 1.668 
 (0.342)*** (0.342)*** (0.518)*** (0.342)*** (0.342)*** (0.342)*** 
Instability 0.513 0.570 0.536 0.564 0.529 0.529 
 (0.242)** (0.240)** (0.321)* (0.241)** (0.242)** (0.242)** 
Ethnic fract. 0.164 0.160 0.554 0.168 0.163 0.163 
 (0.368) (0.369) (0.513) (0.369) (0.369) (0.369) 
Religious fract. 0.326 0.301 -0.467 0.321 0.326 0.326 
 (0.506) (0.506) (0.664) (0.507) (0.506) (0.506) 
Anocracy 0.521 0.373 0.514 0.396 0.488 0.489 
 (0.237)** (0.236) (0.322) (0.245) (0.237)** (0.237)** 
Democracy 0.127 -0.111 -0.407 0.096 0.111 0.118 
 (0.304) (0.310) (0.417) (0.304) (0.303) (0.304) 
Constant -7.019 -6.922 -6.658 -6.952 -6.996 -6.997 
 (0.751)*** (0.745)*** (0.953)*** (0.747)*** (0.749)*** (0.749) 
Observations 6327 6327 3691 6327 6327 6327 














Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5. Replication of Krause and Suzuki (2005) and robustness tests (Asia sample). 
 
 model 5.1 model 5.2 model 5.3 model 5.4 model 5.5 model 5.6 
 polity2 polity2min polity2 (det). standard  
mult. imp. 
theory-based 
mult. imp.  
mult. imp. 
comb. of 5.4 & 5.5 
Per capita income -1.744 -1.643 -1.554 -1.529 -1.519 -1.491 
 (0.963)* (0.895)* (0.844)* (0.884)* (0.853)* (0.839)* 
log(population) 0.152 0.099 0.088 0.119 0.129 0.126 
 (0.136) (0.135) (0.136) (0.148) (0.149) (0.151) 
log(% mountainous) -0.492 -0.461 -0.418 -0.383 -0.372 -0.359 
 (0.435) (0.405) (0.383) (0.417) (0.411) (0.408) 
Noncontiguous state -1.946 -1.727 -1.612 -1.853 -1.881 -1.866 
 (1.612) (1.633) (1.608) (1.589) (1.572) (1.559) 
Oil exporter 0.497 0.453 0.539 0.863 0.891 0.935 
 (1.036) (1.058) (1.107) (1.149) (1.069) (1.075) 
New state 0.499 0.765 0.874 0.664 0.612 0.627 
 (1.190) (1.127) (1.084) (1.133) (1.144) (1.136) 
Instability 0.334 0.498 0.511 0.494 0.482 0.492 
 (0.510) (0.506) (0.520) (0.541) (0.515) (0.518) 
Ethnic fractionalization 4.202 4.349 4.150 3.700 3.572 3.494 
 (2.136)** (2.148)** (2.050)** (2.139)* (2.172)* (2.168)* 
Religious fractionalization 2.932 2.495 2.240 2.464 2.497 2.434 
 (2.785) (2.529) (2.358) (2.673) (2.675) (2.646) 
Militarization 0.585 0.560 0.545 0.566 0.567 0.563 
 (0.295)** (0.271)** (0.258)** (0.282)** (0.281)** (0.278)** 
Trade Openness -0.339 -0.298 -0.284 -0.326 -0.332 -0.331 
 (0.144)** (0.129)** (0.122)** (0.138)** (0.139)** (0.137)** 
Regime 0.678 0.452 0.373 0.516 0.567 0.552 
 (0.366)* (0.258)* (0.233) (0.377) (0.365) (0.364) 
Squared Regime -0.031 -0.021 -0.018 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.016)** (0.011)* (0.010)* (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant 1.686 2.517 2.325 1.000 0.625 0.524 
 (5.178) (5.336) (5.253) (4.912) (4.566) (4.518) 
Observations 609 609 609 609 609 609 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < 0.01. 
